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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
J. R. STONE COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
RAYMOND S. KEATE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 14834 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
---0000000---
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory judgment with 
respect to the meaning of an Option to Purchase real property 
granted by plaintiff to defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court declined to enter specific performance 
sought by both parties on their version of the meaning of an 
Option to Purchase real property, and entered a declaratory 
judgment construing the provisions of the Option, and refused 
to declare the Option void or award damages. 
THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent requests this Court to affirm 
the trial court in all respects. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent accepts as the Statement of Facts the 
lower court's Findings of Fact (amended) at page 156 of the Record,· 
Respondent takes exception to the additional facts in appellant's 
Statement of Facts because appellant repeatedly accepts the lower 
court's findings in its brief. Appellan' r th" c ~ u ges is ourt to rely 
upon the trial court's findings since individual testimony was 
challenged by both parties for credibility. The facts may be 
summarized briefly as follows. Defendant owned Fiber Glass 
Products, Inc., which manufactured fiber glass air filter material 
in Salt Lake City. He needed additional working capital and a n~ 
building. He contacted Gerald R. Turner, an attorney, who 
assisted him to obtain financing through Valley Bank & Trust 
guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (S.B.A.). Turner 
told defendant that they needed a third party to own the building, 
and he recommended John R. Stone, his brother-in-law. Turner 
formed J. R. Stone Company, Inc., the plaintiff (appellant) herein. 
Defendant's company signed a lease for a building to be constructed 
and owned by plaintiff, and plaintiff obtained a construction loan 
from Valley Bank. The cost on the building exceeded the amount 
of the construction loan, so the balance was paid by defendant's 
company, which also paid for lease guarantee insurance to amortize 
the construction loan. Turner prepared an option signed by the 
parties herein granting defendant an option to purchase the new 
building at any time within 14 years from and after September 3o, 
1971. on September 8, 1975, defendant attempted to exercise the 
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option at the price he calculated. Plaintiff refused to 
acknowledge that price, and set a different one. The 
lower court held that neither position was correct and 
held that the option could be exercised at the price 
stated by the lower court in its declaratory judgment 
about the meaning of the words used in the option document. 
As regards plaintiff's claimed "closing", described 
on page 9 of plaintiff-appellant's brief, counsel for both 
parties met and discussed their interpretations of the 
option agreement. Thereafter, this action was commenced. 
As indicated at page 179 of the Record, defendant attempted 
to obtain the lower court's assistance in enforcing a 
.tender in accordance with the court's decision. The lower 
court's Findings do not support the appellant's position 
that defendant Keate acted in bad faith in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED IN REFUSING 
TO DECLARE THE OPTION VOID. 
The lower court held that neither party was entitled 
to damages or specific performance, and that defendant was 
f t . The lower court further held that not entitled to re orma ion. 
neither attempt to exercise was correct because of an ambiguity 
in the document prepared by Attorney Turner. Because neither 
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party had properly construed the option, and attempts to 
exercise and responses while in good faith were not in 
accordance with the requirement of the document as 
interpreted by the Court, the Court properly refused to 
declare the option void. 
The defendant, in his Notice of Exercise of Opti~ 
(Exhibit 5-P), took the position that the purchase price 
for the option was the mortgage balance plus 10% of the 
mortgage balance, and that no liens could exceed the 
purchase price. Plaintiff, however, took the position in 
its reply letter through counsel (Exhibit 6-P) that the 
purchase price was $137,500 plus defendant had to assume 
any and all the liens of record, includi~g the constructioo 
lien to Valley Bank & Trust Company. 
The Court interpreted the option as meaning that 
defendant would have to pay plaintiff $12,500 (10% of the 
original mortgage of $125,000), plus $125,000, out of which 
the construction loan must be paid, and defendant takes the 
property subject to remaining liens and encumbrances of 
record as of the date of the decision of the Court. The 
Court also held that defendant had a choice of assuming the 
construction loan and paying plaintiff the balance of 
equity held by plaintiff. 
Since the Ccurt held that the Option document 
(Exhibit 3-P) was ambiguous, and that neither the attempt 
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to exercise (Exhibit 5-P) nor the response (Exhibit 6-P) were 
accurate, that the Option is still valid and may be 
exercised in accordance with the Court's judgment until 
the Option expires on its own terms on September 30, 1985. 
The Court held that the attempted exercise of the 
Option by defendant was not in accordance with the correct 
construction of the document because language in the document 
is ambiguous. The ambiguity was created by the author of the 
document, Attorney Gerald R. Turner, who acted in the trans-
action for all parties. Keate did not create the ambiguity, 
it exists in the language of the document. 
Appellant argues, on page 13 of its brief, that 
the option is a continuing offer which w~s accepted by defendant's 
letter, Exhibit 5-P. The Exhibit 5-P was not an acceptance 
of the option according to the trial court, and the trial 
court refused to give defendant a deed as requested by 
defendant. Thus, the offer never became a contract as argued 
by appellant, and is still open to defendant to exercise in 
the manner prescribed by the trial court. 
Appellant argues in the alternative that the option 
was refused and rejected. The Court held that defendant's 
attempted exercise, and plaintiff's attempted acceptance, 
were frustrated by an ambiguity in the document. Further, 
at the time of the attempted exercise, defendant believed that 
plaintiff through its president John Stone and his brother-in-law 
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Turner, had defrauded defendant in the transaction, and 
was entitled to construe the ambiguity created by Turner 
in his favor. The terms of defendant's attempted exercise 
are clearly warranted by certain of the language of Exhihlt 
3-P. The Court stated in announcing its decision that "I 
believe that either party here taking a stand on it is 
justified in questioning that instrument." "I think one of 
you have to come to Court." "I think you were both justifa 
in taking the positions you did not in its entirety. But! 
think the option agreement itself is ambiguous enough as 
cited it when you look at it as a whole." (TR 3/25/76 
P. 15 lines 29-30, p. 16, lines 8-9 and 17). 
The attempted exercise was in good faith, and it 
was not construed by the lower court as a counter-proposa. 
in the light of the ambiguity of the document. Defendant 
has at no time intentionally rejected the option agreement' 
refused to comply with its terms, and asked the Court for' 
declaratory judgment in the alternative so that a proper ex' 
cise could be made. 
The actions of the trial court are justified unde: 
the holding in Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.M 
327 (1970), and the clarification of the option language wa: 
proper and within accepted rules of construction to all~! 
evidence of what the parties meant by what they said in the 
document. Green v. Sprague Ranches, 339 P. 2d 607, 610 (l~' 
and authorities cited therein. 
-
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-Appellant then asserts in the alternative that 
the option was not exercised and was later revoked by ap-
pellant, and asserts a lack of consideration. It is clear 
from the evidence that Keate was personally obligated on the 
loans involved, and was the principal officer and majority 
shareholder in Fiber Glass Products. He also provided sub-
stantial funds for the additional costs of construction of 
the building, supervised the construction, and obtained lease 
guarantee insurance for the building. Keate gave more than 
adequate consideration for the option; Stone Company gave 
Keate little for the no-risk equity build-up position it 
obtained through Keate's efforts. TR 3/22/76 Vol. I. p. 39, 
lines 26-30; p. 36, lines 26-28; p. 33, lines 1-3; TR 
3/25/76 Vol. III, pp. 3-14; TR 3/24/76, pp. 94-97. 
POINT II. EXERCISE OF THE OPTION IS 
NOT BARRED BY LACHES. 
The Option Agreement, Exhibit 3-P, specifically 
provides that it may be exercised at any time within fourteen 
years after the date of the option. The Court proceeded with 
a declaratory judgment as to the meaning of the language of 
the Option and whether the lien to Lockhart Company for clean-
~p was a lien which should be paid for by Keate. There is 
no reformation involved in the relief granted by the Court, 
and chus no exercise of the Co~rt's equity jurisdiction. The 
Court considered the plaintiff's claim for equitable relief 
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in the form of laches and denied the same. The Court like-
wise denied defendant's requec:t for f · 
- re orma ti on, or other 
equitable relief based upon fraud. 'l'h c d"d e ourt i allow tie 
lien to Lockhart Company for $15,000 plus interest to st~~ 
the building, even though some of those funds included moni; 
paid to plaintiff's employees. 
The trial court properly refused to apply the 
doctrine of laches in this case. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
CONSTRUED THE TERMS OF THE LEASE IN REGARD 
TO LIENS. 
The purported lien claimed by appellant for an 
unrecorded lien in behalf of Mr. Stone and his father, was 
properly refused by the trial court. The evidence in this 
matter was uncertain regarding all of the expenditures made 
with the Lockhart lien funds, and of which expenditures went 
to normal wear and tear caused· for use of the building as 
a manufacturing plant. There was conflicting testimony as~ 
the ligi timate costs of cleanup of the building and which 
sums were proper. Further, the evidence indicated that afte· 
defendant's company employees and the S. B .A. secured the 
building, vandals broke into the building and damaged the 
premises. The trial court carefully considered the extensi( 
evidence presented on the question of proper cleanup expense 
and declined to impose an equitable lien based upon its vie• 
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of the evidence. That ruling was proper and should not now 
be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this matter is extensive. The trial 
court declined to find fraud, and declined other equitable 
relief. Its ruling is fully supported by the admissible 
evidence, and both parties had full and fair opportunities 
to present their claims. While different readings of portions 
of the record might support differing points of view, the 
record as a whole fully and conclusively sustains the 
decision of the trial court. A serious question in this 
matter was the truthfulness of the testimony of individual 
witnesses. The credibility of each individual witness was 
weighed by the trial court, and its findings of fact fully 
support the judgment. 
DATED this -Z. ~ J day of August, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WATKINS & FABER 
By ~· DaVidLiOYd ~-~~~~~~ 
Attorneys for befendant-Respondent 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
~elephone: 363-4491 
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